CIB

Cornering a Spy Runner in a Knightsbridge Restaurant

Date: 3/31/2021

Author: Kent Moors, Ph.D.


This offering in the Classified Intelligence Brief Spy Tale series has me back in the period where London was my home. Well, South Kensington, to be more precise. In fact, the darling little apartment turned out to be one of the better acquisitions I ever made.

The place had been seconded for intel use, although never quite as a safe house. I lived there off and on for more than a decade while based in the UK and subsequently bought it at a great price during a period of government downsizing (it pays to know the real property owner!). Finally let it go a few years ago for a tidy profit.

But during the late 70s and then throughout most of the 1980s, the two-story narrow flat was home. Situated on a “mews” (a wide alley on which residences were located) connecting Cromwell Road and Queen’s Gate Gardens (at a rather pronounced ninety-degree angle), it was easy walking distance to Knightsbridge, Mayfair (then the location of the US Embassy on Grosvenor Square), Hyde Park, Kensington Gardens, and much of “Embassy Row.”

In short, precisely the location for somebody who had a primary responsibility in counterintelligence (CI).

I was also an easy twenty-minute tube ride via the Piccadilly line to Holborn station and my academic base at the London School of Economic and Political Science (LSE), as well as Russell Square the next stop north. That was near the British Museum where I did my research in the fabled Great Court. I had held a position at the Museum right out of graduate school and would continue to use the Court until the books moved to the huge new British Library by St. Pancras in 1997.

My intel assignments might well take me just about anywhere (as earlier entries in the Spy Tale series attest). But this part of London was my usual base of operations in the early period of my career. I knew it well and still spend time there upon each return to London. If there was any place I called home in those years, it was here. Even more so, it seemed, than my official address back in the States.

“My mews” viewing east from near my front door toward Queen’s Gate Gardens. This photo was taken shortly before I sold the apartment in 2017. source: everchangingmews.com

As usual, some background upfront.

In those days, Russians residing in London were increasing. Today, there are well more than 250,000 Russians living in Greater London alone. Back then concerns over who in the population was there for espionage purposes grew right along with the numbers.

Throughout most of the world, the normal “cover” for such operations was diplomatic, with members of the consular and other crews at embassies serving as intel officers in reality.

However, for the Soviets in London, that became exceptionally difficult after September 1971 and “Operation FOOT.” This was the British expulsion of 105 Soviet officials for spying in what is still the largest single move of its kind in history.

The KGB and GRU (the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Army’s General Staff, probably the largest intel agency in the world and, among other things, primarily responsible for industrial, scientific, and intellectual espionage) never recovered. There were still officers embedded elsewhere (trade delegations, the news services, especially TASS, “goodwill” agencies, and among academic appointments) but the essential coordination occasioned by embassies and consulates had been cut.

This put a major dent in work of the rezidentura, the coordination of Soviet spying operations in any foreign country. Normally, this would be in a secure part of the embassy (as is the American CIA station). But not always. For much of its time in the US, for example, the KGB hub was within the Soviet delegation at the UN in New York, not the embassy in Washington. And for much of that time, the cover job of the “resident,” the person running the operation, was as chauffeur for the Russian UN Ambassador. Always around, but nobody ever seems to notice him.

Usually, however, intel officers under official position could be identified and surveillance initiated. It was the KGB use of other venues that was always the main concern. Throughout both the Soviet and later post-USSR periods Moscow had made (and continues to make) extensive use of “illegals.”

These are KGB who are living in a country but have no official status in the diplomatic corps. They differ from agents or assets, citizens of another country used for intel purposes. Upon occasion, illegals would be on longer-term assignments, the kind requiring they establish a personal base in the country which may include setting up a family and acquiring domestic citizenship.

Think of the recent TV series The Americans.

I had infrequent involvement with tracking illegals in the US. That was an internal matter and essentially run by FBI counter intel. There was an exception. KGB would funnel illegals into the US using Canada as the main corridor. And an episode in that ongoing battle north of the border will be the subject of a later Spy Tale.

My intel career was closer to the American equivalent of this Russian practice. My activities would not usually fall under “official” channels. That is, I would not be in country as some “third cultural attaché” or the like with a posting at the embassy. Rather, I would be there in some non-official cover capacity.

Now in friendly confines like the UK that was not a problem. I was supposed to operate through the chain of command and both MI5 (the Security Service, responsible for domestic activities including chasing spies inside the country and, until recently, in the British Empire abroad) and MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service, or SIS, handling foreign activities) were apprised.

On the other hand, when I would serve in such a capacity elsewhere, matters became dicey. In an adversarial environment it could be downright dangerous. What the KGB called an illegal, we called a NOC (for “no official cover”). That meant apprehension did not allow usage of diplomatic immunity – where the other side declares one persona non grata ­and gives a deadline to get out of the country. A NOC is just arrested.

There was also another major difference with the Russian illegals. Serving as a NOC, I was always still there as a recognized US citizen. My assignment would be hidden, but I remained exactly who the passport said I was (occasionally, the passport even had my real name).

After FOOT, Soviet intelligence activities in the UK were significantly hampered. They had a limited network of assets (British citizens in their employ) but they were of little value. The British were quite good at controlling such activity. The KGB had no choice but to put greater reliance on the illegals.

That meant operatives who had been buried for other reasons (the “moles” of espionage fiction) would have to surface for more day-to-day ops. And an intel version of Whack-a-Mole ensued. MI5 hardly had the manpower to follow all these folks (even if they knew who they were).

But much of my time while living in London involved the illegals. Universities and other academic centers had always been preferred locations in which to place illegals. It was difficult as a foreigner to obtain a job in Britain. Academic appointments, on the other hand, were encouraged as a way of exchanging scholarship with foreign colleagues.

I was already ensconced at LSE, under my own name no less. LSE was known then (and still is) as a hotbed for left-of-center politics with connections to other institutions, faculty, and students.

Once again, my “day job” provided a nice base for my other life. My shared LSE office was in this building on Portugal Street by Clare Market…

photo: lse.ac.uk

…around the corner from this place…

13-14 Portsmouth Street, Holborn photo: London-walking-tours.co.uk

…and virtually across the street from where I usually had lunch:

Charles IV Pub, 28 Portugal Street, Holborn photo: pubwiki.co.uk

We are at the point in this Spy Tale where I must tread lightly. It also involved some concerted push back from “mother.” Acknowledging that I would upon occasion utilize a NOC status was a major concession but discussing how I accomplished assignments (sources and methods) is still quite off the table. So, I need to provide here a very truncated version of what transpired.

There was no way to keep track of several thousand Russian nationals, some of whom were also illegals. Much more important for MI5 purposes (and ours) was the need to ascertain the reporting chains between the “foot soldiers” and those who were replacing the damaged rezidentura. The objective was an ability to monitor (control and observe) what was going on. Throw another guy out of the country, they would just eventually replace him, requiring that you start from scratch.

Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t. And if he could be compromised and flipped, so much the better.

This became a process of triangulation involving a fair amount of shoe leather. Despite its reduced spying effectiveness, one starting point in the process remained the embassy. Today, the embassy location for the Russian Federation in London remains the same as what the USSR occupied during my time.

Russian Embassy, 13 Kensington Palace Gardens photo: rusemb.org.uk

As might be expected, this building was under constant surveillance, both physical and electronic. It was also close to my apartment on the other side of Kensington Gardens. That allowed occasional walk byes.

It was hardly expected that the members of the network would just waltz up to the front door and ring the bell. Still, surveillance of the comings and goings along with the usual chase car never hurt.

That was somebody else’s responsibility. Mine was to connect some dots. I was provided with a list we compiled of several hundred Russians living in London who were possible illegals, some related to academe and some not.

I thought it a waste of time to follow them. Surveillance is a laborious process requiring a team of several who knew what they were doing. There were not the personnel or the budget to justify this.

Instead, I decided to rely upon something else. Perhaps I could focus on where the communications took place rather than try to follow some of the possible participants.

Russians feel an intense connection to their homeland. When out of the county for any length of time, they are drawn to those places reminding them of home. Extending the area of interest just a bit, one likely place emerged.

A restaurant with authentic home cooking.

Once again it was also within easy walking distance and on my own turf (east on Cromwell past the National History and Victoria & Albert Museums on to Brompton Road and then through Knightsbridge Green to the restaurant). As it happens, it is also a place I frequented.

Mari Vanna, Wellington Court, Knightsbridge Photo: londontime.com

Mari Vanna is a famous restaurant between Harrods and Hyde Park. There are today other places with the same name in New York, Washington, Moscow, and St. Petersburg. This is as Rossiya as it gets. While the staff speak English, it is not the preferred language. It was the meeting place for the upper levels of the Russian diaspora in London.

Mari Vanna at “Orthodox” Christmas, January 1987

Two of the figures on my list (both academics) visited Mari Vanna several times a month, always in the late afternoon and always together. Each time they would meet with the same man (at that table in the far center of the picture above). On one occasion, plastic shopping bags were exchanged under the table.

On the next occasion, we set up surveillance from the restaurant by a particularly good MI5 “floating box” shadow team. The “third man” ended up here:

The USSR Trade Delegation (now Trade Delegation of Russia in the UK), 32-33 Highgate W Hill, Highgate photo: rustrade.org.uk

His identity was established quickly thereafter, and the Brits began the process of turning him. My illegals continued to live their cover lives, although we made certain they had no access to anything important.

OK, seems I made some progress here. Two illegals and their controller down, several hundred or so left to go.

Dr. Kent Moors

This is an installment of Classified Intelligence Brief, your guide to what’s really happening behind the headlines… and how to profit from it. Dr. Kent Moors served the United States for 30 years as one of the most highly decorated intelligence operatives alive today (including THREE Presidential commendations).

After moving through the inner circles of royalty, oligarchs, billionaires, and the uber-rich, he discovered some of the most important secrets regarding finance, geo-politics, and business. As a result, he built one of the most impressive rolodexes in the world. His insights and network of contacts took him from a Vietnam veteran to becoming one of the globe’s most sought after consultants, with clients including six of the largest energy companies and the United States government.

Now, Dr. Moors is sharing his proprietary research every week… knowledge filtered through his decades as an internationally recognized professor and scholar, intelligence operative, business consultant, investor, and geo-political “troubleshooter.” This publication is designed to give you an insider’s view of what is really happening on the geo-political stage.

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